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This study investigates the determinants of companiesʼ voluntary information disclosure.
Employing a large and unique dataset on the companiesʼ own earnings forecasts and their
frequencies, we conducted an empirical analysis of the eﬀects of a ﬁrmʼs ownership, board, and
capital structures on information disclosure. Our ﬁndings are consistent with the hypothesis that
the custom of cross-holding among companies strengthens entrenchment by managers. We also
ﬁnd that bank directors force managers to disclose information more frequently. In addition,
our results show the borrowing ratio is positively associated with information frequency,
suggesting that the manager is likely to reveal more when his or her ﬁrm borrows money from
ﬁnancial institutions. However, additional borrowings beyond the minimum level of eﬀective
borrowings decrease the managementʼs disclosing incentive.
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The corporate governance literature has discussed many mechanisms for resolving the
fundamental issue: the agency problem.
1 Perhaps the most pervasive and important factor
causing the agency problem between a manager and an investor is the informational
asymmetries between them.
2 If managers who are better informed about their future prospects
have divergent incentives from their investors, they may expropriate investorsʼ beneﬁts for their
private objectives.
One of the principal remedies to agency problems is the law.
3 Regulatory interventions
could give outside investors certain powers to protect their investment against expropriation by
insiders, and meanwhile, require ﬁrms to comply with investor protection such as information
disclosure. In Japan, companies accessing capital markets are required to follow The
Commercial Code and the Securities and Exchange Law. The Commercial Code requires all
companies to prepare individual ﬁnancial statements, consisting of a balance sheet, an income
statement, and a proposal for distribution and appropriation of retained earnings, and to disclose
the balance sheet. In addition, the Securities and Exchange Law requires publicly held
companies to prepare and disclose both consolidated and individual ﬁnancial statements.
Furthermore, to enhance the transparency of corporate accounting, since 1974, Tokyo Securities
Exchange (TSE) has requested the managers of all exchange-listed ﬁrms to submit a Brief
Letter of Financial Results, or “Kessan Tanshin” in Japanese (hereafter Tanshin) within 70 days
of the end of the ﬁscal year.
4
Tanshin has been watched with keen interest by outside investors because it contains
precious information that is not provided by annual reports. First, traditional ﬁnancial
statements do not always provide the forward-looking information that outside investors might
ﬁnd useful. In contrast to annual reports, Tanshin reports forecast values for the coming yearʼs
sales, ordinary income, proﬁts, and dividends,
5 notjustt he currentyear ʼs values. Second, as
opposed to earnings-related forecasts delivered by market analysts, Tanshin have been made by
managers who have superior information to outside investors on their ﬁrmsʼ expected future
performance, which outside ﬁnancial analysts are not able to know. Moreover, Tanshin reports
point earnings forecasts, rather than reporting interval estimates or implicit expects.
6 Finally,
all ﬁrms are required to disclose the forecasts at least once a year, but are virtually given a free
hand in the decision on the timing and frequency of the release.
The Japanese legal system gives managers the discretion to reveal more or withhold
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1 Berle and Means (1932) and the inﬂuential work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasize that the managers of
publicly traded ﬁrms pursue their own private objectives, which need not coincide with those of outside investors.
2 Bhattacharya (1979) and Miller and Rock (1985) use information-asymmetry models, arguing that managers know
more than investors about the ﬁrmʼs future prospects.
3 See La Porta et al. (1998) for example, who explore the legal rules covering protection of corporate shareholders
and creditors, the origin of these rules, and the quality of their enforcement in 49 countries.
4 TSE has requested the managers of the ﬁrst section and second section of exchanged-listed ﬁrms to submit Tanshin
quarterly since 2008 ﬁscal year.
5 Reporting of operating income has been required since 2007 ﬁscal year.
6 Skinner (1994) points out that good news disclosures tend to be point or range estimates, whereas bad news
disclosures tend to be qualitative statements about the current quarterʼs earnings.corporate information. Some managers reveal information only once a year to meet the
minimum criterion, while others reveal information more than nine times in the same year.
Figure 1 shows the trends of disclosure frequency from 1996 to 2004. We observe that most
companies disclosed their earnings forecasts less than twice each year before 2000. In contrast,
the number of disclosures began to exhibit heterogeneity in 2001. Although the precise reasons
behind the increase are still to be investigated, we can point out several factors that might have
contributed to the change. First, all the listed companies have been required to issue ﬁnancial
statements every quarter since 2008. Although the quarterly issuance of Tanshin is not required,
itis possible t hatsome ﬁrms began to issue ﬁnancial statements as well as Tanshin to achieve a
smooth transition from an annual system to a quarterly system by adopting the future system in
advance. Second, foreign investors have increased their presence in the Japanese stock market.
Itis possible t hatcompany managers feltincreasing pressure from foreign invest ors t o disclose
information to the entire capital market. Third, more and more listed companies began to rely
on direct ﬁnance rather than indirect ﬁnance for ﬁnancing their activities. If the role of the
main bank system is weakening, the importance of information disclosure to the capital market
for ﬁrms mustincrease.
7 The latter two aspects motivate this research.
Tanshin data contain several characteristics that provide us with a good opportunity to
investigate the relationship between information disclosure and ﬁrm characteristics. First, as
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7 The related revised accounting standards for information disclosure are as follows: Amendment for Accounting
Standard for Consolidated Financial Statement (1997), Accounting Standard for Consolidated Statement of Cash Flows,
etc. (1998), Accounting Standard for Interim Consolidated Financial Statements (1998), Accounting Standard for
Operating Risk, Performance, and Corporate Governance (2003).
FIG 1. ANNOUNCEMENT FREQUENCY FROM 1996 TO 2004noted above, all the listed companies have to issue at least one Tanshin report every year that
contains forecast of sales, proﬁt, etc., for the coming ﬁscal year. Therefore, our dataset can
cover all the listed companies, which prevents self-selection bias. Second, the number of
Tanshin issued by a company in a year varies to a great extent. Some companies submit nine
Tanshin a year, whereas some issue just once a year. Therefore, we can utilize this information
to identify companiesʼ willingness to disclose their situation to the public. Many previous works
use the accuracy of analyst forecasts as a proxy of information disclosure.
8 One of the
potentially serious problems in using the forecast errors is the eﬀectof window dressing.
9 This
refers to a company that obtains exactly the same amount of proﬁts as was forecast by analysts,
either because the company previously gave the correct information to the public, or because
the company manipulated the account information to ensure the reported proﬁt matched the
forecast value. Although frequency information is not completely free from window dressing
eﬀects, we expect the eﬀects are not serious. To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst
study to use Tanshin data for investigating the relationship among managementʼs earnings
forecasts and ﬁrm characteristics.
Using Japanese data provides an additional advantage for analyzing the role of banking
monitoring in information disclosure. Japanese corporate governance has long been known as a
system of bank-centered ﬁnancing. Although the eﬀectiveness of the so-called main bank
system is now under serious debate, many listed companies still borrow signiﬁcantamount s of
money from banks and accept former bankers on their board of directors. By utilizing detailed
information on the bank-company relationship in Japan, we can investigate the eﬀects of the
main bank system on information disclosure.
10
Accordingly, this paper examines how a ﬁrmʼs ownership structure, borrowing from
ﬁnancial institutions, relationship with banks, and scale inﬂuence the managerʼs decision on
information release. With the comprehensive data on Tanshin, this research contributes to
corporate governance literature in three ways. First, this research makes an important
contribution to the ﬁeld of corporate disclosure by suggesting that concentrated ownership is
negatively related to managerʼs earnings forecast. Furthermore, cross-holding enhances the
entrenchment concern resulting from opaque corporate information. Second, a manager whose
company performed badly is inclined to release information more frequently, possibly in order
to establish a reputation for transparent accounting reports. Third, ﬁnancial institutions-oriented
ﬁnancing encourages managers to issue information frequently.
The remainder of this research is organized as follows. Section II provides our research
hypotheses and methodology. Section III describes the data and descriptive statistics for all
variables adopted in this research. Section IV presents the empirical results of the determinants
of the managerʼs disclosure decision, and conducts several robustness tests. Section V concludes
this research.
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8 See Koga and Uchino (2006), for example.
9 Evidence indicates that analystsʼ earnings forecasts play a valuable role in improving market eﬃciency (Barth and
Hutton, 2000). However, Lang and Lundholmʼs (1993a) study shows that a managementʼs disclosure decision has eﬀects
on analystsʼ decisions. The results of Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) suggest that analystsʼ forecastrevisions fail t o
include all the information about future earnings and, on average, investors appear to recognize this fact.
10 Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1990, 1991) have explored the cross-sectional diﬀerences in corporate
governance structures among Japanese Keiretsu and independent ﬁrms based on the theory of information asymmetry
and agency problem.II. A Simple Model and Empirical Methodology
1. Model
This section develops a simple empirical model of information disclosure. As discussed in
the previous section, Japanese listed ﬁrms are required to disclose future sales and proﬁt
forecasts at least once a year. Suppose at time t, that a company i announces to the public
through Tanshin that its expected sales in 12 months are Et[Salest+12, i].
As time passes, the company obtains more information on its business, which implies that
the expected value of future sales will change and become more accurate. Suppose the
company does not issue Tanshin between time t andt+bt. Att ime t+bt, the expected sales at t+12
become Et+bt[Salest+12, i].
We deﬁne the absolute value of the departure of the expected sales from the previous
estimate as:
dt+bt, i6|Et+bt[Salest+12, i],Et[Salest+12, i]. (1)
Assume that there is a cost for a ﬁrm to issue Tanshin and make its forecast sales value
public. In such a case, similar to the (s, S) model for inventories or the menu costs model for
price change, it is natural to regard the issuance of Tanshin as an optimal stopping time
problem.
Suppose that following its initial Tanshin announcement, company i issues new Tanshin
every ﬁscal year when and only when:
dt+bt, i>zi, (2)
where zi is the threshold value of the new information disclosure. Assume the threshold value is
diﬀerent among companies and can be written as a function of the beneﬁtand costof issuing
new Tanshin, such as:
zi=f(Bit,Cit), f '>0, f ''<0. (3)
Bit denotes the beneﬁt from issuing new Tanshin. Previous theoretical research
11 points out
that the most important beneﬁt from greater disclosure is a reduction in the cost of equity
capital. That occurs because greater disclosure can address the adverse selection problem
resulting from asymmetric information, thereby mitigating the investorʼs demand for additional
compensation for risky uncertainty. Therefore, Bit can be regarded as a function of variables
that aﬀects the agency problems between outside investors and the company manager.
Among many possible determinants of Bit, we focus on (1) the companyʼs reliance on
indirect ﬁnance, (2) board composition, (3) ownership concentration, (4) cross-holding, and (5)
relationship with the bank.
First, if company i heavily relies on banks or other ﬁnancial institutions for its ﬁnancial
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11 Verrecchia (1982), Diamond and Verrecchia (1994).activity, there is not so much gain for the company from information disclosure to outside
investors. Therefore, Bit is expected to be small for such a company. Second, if outside board
members are playing disciplinary roles for the sake of outside investors, as found by Weisbach
(1988), a company with more outside board members is more likely to gain greater beneﬁts
from information disclosure.
The eﬀects of ownership structure and bank relations are somewhat more complicated.
Among all the corporate investors, large shareholders are in principle able to appoint board
members representing their interests, and meanwhile they can hire or ﬁre incumbentmanagers.
In addition, large shareholders can also exercise their power by blocking ratiﬁcation of
unfavorable decisions, which results in a greater value for Bit with large shareholders.
However, large shareholders may also cause adverse eﬀects on Bit . When large
shareholders eﬀectively control corporations, their policies may result in the expropriation of
minorit y shareholders. For example, Morck etal. (1988) reporta large and signi ﬁcantvalue
discountfor US ﬁrms with large shareholders. They interpret this ﬁnding as evidence of
managerial entrenchment.
12 Along a similar vein, large shareholders may harm outside
investorsʼ interests in terms of corporate ﬁnancial disclosure. Especially in Japan, many ﬁrms
mutually hold other companiesʼ shares and cement their relationship through these holdings.
This cross-holding reduces the threats of hostile takeovers for incumbent managers and
strengthens the managersʼ beneﬁts at the expense of outside investors. In other words, cross-
holding among ﬁrms weakens managersʼ incentives to reveal information to the public. In sum,
Bit can be increasing with the existence of large shareholders, while it is also likely that cross-
holding among ﬁrms trade oﬀ those beneﬁts.
As the main source of external funding, it has been argued that banks play important roles
in corporate ﬁnancing and governance. In Japan, banks notonly provide ﬁrms with loans but
also hold ﬁrmsʼ equity. Furthermore, banks occasionally send top managers to the board of
directors of a ﬁrm with ﬁnancial dist ress. Act ing merely as a lender, a bank will getatmosta
ﬁxed payment(int erestand principle) and will care more abouta ﬁrmʼs downside. However, as
a shareholder, a bank cares much more about the value of the stock that is associated with a
ﬁrmʼs performance. The dual roles enhance banksʼ incentives to monitor the ﬁrms they lend to
and in which they hold shares.
13 Therefore, bank monitoring is viewed as the optimal
governance mechanism when monitoring costs are high and takeovers rarely happens in the
market.
14 In such a case, Bit is a decreasing function of the degree of the relationship between
the company and bank.
In sum, Bit is a decreasing function of (1) the degree of indirect ﬁnance, and (2) the degree
of cross-holding.
Cit in Equation (3) is the cost for issuing a new Tanshin. One obvious factor from the
costs is the scale of the company. The bigger the company is, the more costly it is to gather
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12 The ﬁrstempirical evidence now recognized as indicat ive of managerial ent renchmentis Johnson etal. (1985).
13 Loan insurance may reduce the incentive of a bank, as a lender, to monitor a ﬁrm; however, since the default risk
of equities is generally higher than loans, a bank, as a major shareholder, has a strong incentive to monitor the ﬁrm.
Meanwhile, the lender-borrower relationship between bank and ﬁrm gives bank an advantage as a monitor because the
bank knows the ﬁrmʼs credit quality more than other shareholders.
14 John and Kediaʼs (2000) work suggests that diﬀerenteconomies would design diﬀerent optimal corporate
governance systems. One implication of their analysis is that the optimal governance system in Japan may continue to
rely on bank monitoring if banks are able to maintain a comparative advantage in monitoring.correct information on all the company activities. Therefore, we assume Cit is an increasing
function of the company scale.




where Frequencyit is the number of Tanshin issued by company i in ﬁscal year t, Xit is a vector
that represents company characteristics such as ownership concentration and board composition,
d ˆ
it is the absolute value of the departure of the realized sales from its forecasted value, and eit
is the iid error term. The third term on the right-hand side of (4), the interaction term of Xit and
d ˆ
it, is expected to capture the eﬀects of corporate governance on information disclosure.
Based on the above arguments in this section, we set the following hypotheses in relation
to the frequency of information disclosure to the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the
forecastand realized values of company performance.
H1: Need for external funds increases the disclosure frequency.
H2: Large shareholders increase the frequency of managerial earnings forecast, whereas
cross-holding shares among ﬁrms has an adverse eﬀecton informat ion disclosure.
H3: The existence of a bank director increases the disclosure frequency.
Although g in (4) is the main parameter when we test the above hypotheses, we also pay
attention to b because the data we use in the empirical analysis may not correspond exactly
with d ˆ
it . If there are unobservable variables that contain similar information to d ˆ
it,th e
interaction eﬀects will appear as a part of b.I ns u c hac a s e ,b includes the corporate
governance eﬀects on information disclosure.
2. Methodology
We employ an ordered probit model to analyze the determinants of frequency of
information disclosure.
15 Let y be the observed frequency of issuance of Tanshin, which is
determined by the following model with a latent y
*:
y
*=Xb+ee |X〜Normal(0, 1), (5)
where X does not contain a constant. Let a1<a2<…<aJ be unknown cutoﬀ points (for
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15 To control unobservable ﬁrm characteristics, it is more appropriate to adopt a “ﬁxed eﬀects” model. We do not
take this approach because 1) with such short time horizons, four years, biases due to incidental parameter problems are
serious, and 2) ﬁxed eﬀects models signiﬁcantly weaken the power of statistics.…
y=Jif y
*>aJ.
For example, if y takes values of 0, 1, and 2, then there are two cutoﬀ points: a1 and a2.




III. Description of the Sample and Data
1. Sample
The data used in this analysis covers all the listed ﬁrms in Japan butexcludes foreign
companies,
16 banks, insurance ﬁrms, and securities companies. The sample period covers 2001-
2004. Datasets are constructed from two main sources. The NEEDS database contains data on
Tanshin, borrowings, ownership structure, and company ﬁnancial statements, while Toyo Keizai
provides us with detailed information on board composition, including age, academic
background, previous career, director hierarchy, and so forth. Therefore, we are able to identify
the banking connection from the career background of the individual director.
17 From
information on the ownership structure and shares held by each company, we construct a
dataset on cross-holding.
18
Firms that became bankrupt, merged, or were acquired are omitted from our sample.
Matching the two main datasets by Nikkei Code
19 and ﬁscal year, we obtain 2270, 2376, 2389,
and 2414 observations for 2001-2004, respectively.
2. Descriptive Statistics
Tables 1 and 2 reportt he de ﬁnition and descriptive statistics on the explanatory variables
used in this analysis, respectively. Table 2 shows that the Top 10 shareholders and “the special
few” shareholders together hold about 50% of all the shares, whereas foreign shareholders hold
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16 Foreign company is deﬁned as a ﬁrm of which at least one-thirds equity shares are owned by one particular
foreign shareholder.
17 Taking advantage of detailed information on individual directors, we deﬁne ﬁrms as banking-connected if they
have directors coming from banks on their boards, and non banking-connected ﬁrms otherwise. In addition, it should be
noted that we include neither executive directors, who have no obligations or responsibilities for management and
monitoring, nor statutory auditors, as they are barred from performing management function.
18 We calculate two types of cross-shareholders, by merging the Nikkei large shareholder database (okabunusi) with
the Nikkei company shareholding database (kigyohoyukabu database). The cross-shareholder is deﬁned as a shareholder
who is one of the largest 30 shareholders of the company, and whose shares are also held by the company. It should be
noted that we do not include the shares held by a companyʼs subsidiaries. In addition, in order to investigate the eﬀect
of the banking relationship on information disclosure, we subdivide large cross-shareholders into large banking cross-
shareholders who are in the banking industry and others.only 5.8% of shares during the period of 2001-2004.
20 That is to say, overall, the listed ﬁrms
in Japan have been dominated by large shareholders.
21 In addition, the ratio of borrowing to
assets averaged 21% during this period. This implies that ﬁrms still relied heavily on indirect
ﬁnancing when they raised corporate funds; at the same time, 34% of listed ﬁrms further
cement the relationship with banks by accepting the banker directors on their board of directors.
Thatalso shows t hatlist ed ﬁrms still maintained close relationships with their main banks in
the early 2000s.
22
We employ return on equity (ROE), and return to assets (ROA) to measure ﬁrm
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19 The Nikkei code is compiled by Nikkei Economics Inc. for exchange-listed and OTC ﬁrms. Unlike the Tosho code
(where company IDs are created by the Tokyo Stock Exchange), the Nikkei code for ﬁrms, which is repealed from
stock exchange trading, is retained.
20 It should be noted that we take lagged values of all variables except ROE, ROA, and the forecast deviation.
However, owing to a lack of data on the composition of majority shareholders for 2000, we do not include the special
shareholdersʼ ratio, the bank shareholderʼs ratio, the foreign shareholderʼs ratio, the cross-holding ratio, and the bank
cross-holding ratio in Table 2.
21 Prowse (1992) shows that the top ﬁve shareholders of all listed Japanese corporations hold 33.1% of the ﬁrmsʼ
shares on average, and households and foreign shareholders hold only 31.7%.
22 We have also regressed the frequency of reporting on the ratio of outside directors to board size (outsiderʼs ratio),
butt he resultis notsigni ﬁcant. The outsiderʼs ratio has decreased slightly from 40.4% in 2001 to 35.5% in 2004. Most
















Frequency of forecasting announcements.
Deﬁnition Variables Time
ROA
Ratio of shares held by foreigner investors. Lagged value
Percentage of shares held by the “special few,” which consists of the
top then shareholders, directors and their relatives. Only stable
holdings are included.
Lagged value
Ratio of shares held by top 10 shareholders. Lagged value
Control Proxies
Lagged value
Binary variable taking the value 1 if the ﬁrms have banker directors
on their boards and zero otherwise.
Lagged value
TABLE 1. VARIABLE DEFINITION
The ratio of borrowing to total assets. Lagged value
Frequency
The ratio of outside directors to total directors. Outside director is
deﬁned as a director who worked for other companies before joining
the current company.
The ratio of operating income to equity. Current value
The ratio of shares held by majority shareholders whose shares are
also held by the ﬁrm itself.
Lagged value
Currentvalue
Natural logarithms of (total assets deﬂated by the CPI). Lagged value
The ratio of operating income to assets deﬂated by the CPI. Current value
The absolute value of the relative diﬀerence between achieved sales
and forecasted sales.performance. As well, a number of variables are controlled to capture the fundamental
determinants of the frequency of managementsʼ earnings forecasts. First, as ﬁrms with the
highest forecast error tend to show the highest contemporaneous forecast, the potential
endogeneity problem is mitigated by controlling the forecast deviation, which is calculated as
the absolute value of the diﬀerence between the realized value and the initial forecast value.
The forecast deviation provides an estimate of the unexpected portion of the management
forecast. Second, ﬁrm size is measured as the logarithmic value of total assets deﬂated by the
CPI. During the four years from 2001 to 2004, the scale of ﬁrms did notshow any expansion.
Moreover, disclosure policies have been changing over time. Therefore, a year dummy controls
for time trends in frequency of disclosure. Finally, ﬁrmsʼ strategies of information disclosure
varies across diﬀerent industries. We use industrial dummies based on 33 diﬀerentt hree-digit
industry codes, deﬁned by Nikkei Economics Inc. We also have dropped the extreme 1% of all
variables except the indicator of the bank-relation variable.
In addition, the third term on the right-hand side of Equation (4), the interaction term of
Xit, and the interaction term of d ˆ
it are measured by multiplying forecast deviation with
ownership structure, board structure, the borrowing ratio, and the ﬁrmʼs scale, respectively.
Those interaction terms pick up the pure eﬀects of corporate governance on the information
disclosure.
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3.18 3 1 1.23 9
Mean Median Min SD Max
Note: The sample includes all nonﬁnancial and nonforeign companies. We winsorize the outliers of all variables
and use lagged values of all variables except ROE, ROA, and the forecast deviation. Forecast deviation is the









0.49 0.48 0 0.15 0.94





0.027 0 0 0.058 0.58
TABLE 2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON INDEPENDENT VARIABLES US E DI NT H E
EMPIRICAL REGRESSION BASED ON THE AVERAGE FOR 2001-2004
0.058 0.019
0.48 1
3.5 2.8 -10 4.1 19
0.35 2.8 -107 14 28
Frequency
11 11 5.1 1.4 16
0.26 0.2 0 0.25 1
0.34 0 0
0.019 0 0.12 6.9
0.039 0.021 0 0.12 7.1
0.08 0.045 0 0.19 8.7
0.081 6.4
0.0017 0 0 0.0066 0.29
0.0049 0.00074 0 0.023 0.86
0.035
0.026 0.0066 0 0.11 4.8
0.027 0 0 0.1 5.5
0.017 0.0045 0
0.83 0.49 0 1.8 98IV. Empirical Results
The main empirical results of estimations of (7) are reported in Table 3. Model 1 of Table
3 reports that the variable ʻTop 10 shareholderʼ is signiﬁcantly and negatively related to the
disclosure frequency. The borrowing ratio and banker directors contribute to the frequency.
However, ﬁrm size and performance negatively aﬀectt he managers ʼ incentives to release
information. This indicates concentrated ownership ﬁrms and big ﬁrms are less likely to reveal
ﬁnancial information to the public. However, managers are pushed into revealing information to
enhance the ﬁnancial transparency of the corporations when 1) ﬁrm performance goes down; 2)
the ﬁrm raises funds through ﬁnancial institutions; 3) there is a banker director on the board;
and 4) the foreign shareholdersʼ ratio is high, which is consistent with the common perception
t hatforeign shareholders expectmore ﬁnancial transparency than domestic investors and
therefore contribute to a higher frequency of disclosure.
In Model 2 of Table 3, we observe a negative and signiﬁcantcoe ﬃcientfor t he cross-
holding ratio, indicating that cross-holding is the most important factor in weakening
managements disclosing incentives. The focus of Model 3 of Table 3 is the eﬀectof corporat e
governance on the disclosing strategy. We recast Model 2 by adding interaction terms between
the forecast deviation and the ﬁrmsʼ fundamental characteristics. The results show explicitly that
the borrowing ratio is positively associated with management announcement, and there is a
statistically signiﬁcant interaction between the forecast error and the amount of a companyʼs
borrowings from ﬁnancial institutions. This implies that an additional companyʼs borrowing
from ﬁnancial institutions yields a stronger decrease in the frequency of earnings forecasts for a
lower forecasterror. In Table 3 ʼs Model 4, we replace the ʻTop 10ʼ ratio with the special few
shareholdersʼ ratio, and in Model 5, we use ROA as a proxy instead of ROE, which gives
virtually identical results.
In sum, the results in Table 3 support our hypotheses 1 and 3, suggesting that raising
funds through ﬁnancial institutions and the incentive of attracting foreign investors push
managers into consciously revealing earnings forecasts. Banker directors play a positive role in
addressing the asymmetric information problem. On the other hand, our results do not support
hypothesis 2, suggesting that the existence of stable large shareholders has a strong negative
eﬀects on information disclosure. Meanwhile, among the large shareholders, cross-holding
decreases the disclosure-deviation sensitivity. Ironically, the higher disclosure frequency does
not necessarily indicate that ﬁrms have better performance. Instead, it might indicate that
managers increase disclosure frequency for the purpose of yielding a positive reputation eﬀect.
Tables 4 and 5 test the robustness of the ﬁnding that controlling shareholder, crossholding
ratio, ﬁrm size and ﬁrm performance have signiﬁcantly negative eﬀecton informat ion
disclosure, whereas the borrowing ratio and banking directors bring signiﬁcantly positive eﬀect
on information disclosure. The results in Tables 4 and 5 are consistent with the results in Table
3, although crossholding ratio does not have a statistically signiﬁcantcoe ﬃcientwhen
interaction terms are included in Table 5.
Over all, our empirical ﬁndings lead us to the conclusion that ﬁrms with concentrated
ownership are relatively reluctant to disclose corporate information. More speciﬁcally, cross-
holding heightens the asymmetric information problem. Interaction terms ﬁrms on a small scale
or with decreasing performance tend to reveal information more frequently. We conjecture that



























(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Note: The sample includes all nonﬁnancial and nonforeign companies. We winsorize the outliers of all variables
and use lagged values of all variables exceptROE, ROA, and forecastdeviat ion. The forecastdeviat ion is t he
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-6.73 -2.52 -3.26 Cross
*Deviation
(0.11) (0.668) (0.167)this is because when ﬁrms are at the limit of their advantage scale, or performing poorly, they
compete with their industrial peers by revealing corporate information frequently in order to
attract public attention. In addition, we conﬁrm the implication of previous studies, which is
that information disclosure has a positive eﬀect on reducing capital costs, and thereby ﬁrms
tend to consciously reveal ﬁnancial information to the public owing to their need for external
ﬁnance. Furthermore, our results are consistent with Diamondʼs (1984) work, which shows that
delegated monitoring by a banker may be eﬃcientas a means of avoiding duplicat ion of
monitoring by small investors, but contrast with former literature employing analystsʼ forecast
accuracy by Koga and Uchino (2006).





















Note: The sample includes all nonﬁnancial and nonforeign companies. We winsorize the outliers of all variables

































TABLE 4. ORDERED PROBIT,O RDERED LOGIT, AND OLS OF FREQUENCY AND FIRMSʼ

















































Note: The sample includes all nonﬁnancial and nonforeign companies. We winsorize the outliers of all variables
and use lagged values of all variables exceptROE, ROA, and forecastdeviat ion. The forecastdeviat ion is t he
absolute value of the diﬀerence between the realized value and the initial forecast value. Robust t values are
presented in the parentheses, where
*,
**,a n d























TABLE 5. ORDERED PROBIT,O RDERED LOGIT, AND OLS OF FREQUENCY AND FIRMSʼ



































































This study investigated the determinants of managersʼ information disclosure decisions in
Japanese listed ﬁrms. We explored the eﬀects of ownership structure, borrowings from ﬁnancial
institutions, bank relationship, and ﬁrm size on a managerʼs disclosure frequency. Our main
ﬁndings are as follows. 1) large shareholders have negative eﬀects on a managerʼs forecast
frequency, and furthermore, large cross-holding shareholders increase the concern of entrench-
ment resulting from opaque corporate information; 2) a high borrowing ratio is favorable to
information disclosure; 3) larger ﬁrms are reluctant to convey information to the public; and
ﬁnally, 4) poorly performing ﬁrms are likely to advertise themselves via frequent disclosure of
earnings forecasts.
Our results are statistically robust and imply that companies whose shares are concentrated
among a few groups do not regard their information disclosure to the public as seriously as do
other ﬁrms. Nevertheless, we recognize that a large unobservable eﬀectremains and t hatt his
eﬀect might be correlated with various measures of the concentration of ﬁrms. The eﬀects of
the top 10 shareholderʼs ratio and of the majority shareholderʼs ratio should be further clariﬁed.
Meanwhile, we would like to consider the eﬀectof ﬂuctuations in stock prices on managersʼ
disclosure decisions for our nextproject .
Finally, we recognize that the frequency of information disclosure does not completely
address concerns about ﬁrm manipulation. Although we are certain that this proxy is the best
choice when alternatives are not known, we should continue our quest for better proxies.
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